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Note
Mu'min v. Virginia: Reexamining the Need
for Content Questioning During Voir Dire
in High Profile Criminal Cases
I. Introduction
In Mu'min v. Virginia,1 the United States Supreme Court,
in a five to four decision, held that the Constitution does not
require that potential jurors be asked questions regarding the
content of pretrial publicity during the voir dire2 in every in-
stance in which the potential jurors have indicated exposure to
it.3 The Court acknowledged that content questioning4 is prefer-
able in cases where pretrial publicity presents the risk of an un-
fair trial, but held that it is not constitutionally mandated in all
circumstances.5
Petitioner Dawud Majid Mu'min had been charged with the
murder of a storekeeper.' The crime had attracted substantial
media attention. 7 News stories had given details not only of the
1. 111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991).
2. Voir dire literally means "to speak the truth." The phrase describes the prelimi-
nary examination that the court or attorneys make of prospective jurors to determine
their qualifications and suitability to serve as jurors. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1575 (6th
ed. 1990).
3. Mu'min, 111 S. Ct. at 1908.
4. Content questioning describes the questioning of potential jurors about the spe-
cific contents of news items that they have seen or heard. Id. at 1912 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
5. Mu'min, 111 S. Ct. at 1908.
6. Id. at 1901.
7. Id.
1
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crime, but also of Mu'min's previous murder conviction, his
prison record, and his confession to the recent murder.8 Despite
the stories' wide circulation, the Supreme Court held that the
trial court's failure to probe the content of the potential jurors'
exposure to the stories was not violative of Mu'min's constitu-
tional guarantee of a fair trial." The Court, in effect, held that a
potential juror who admitted exposure to pretrial publicity could
merely assert impartiality and successfully avoid
disqualification. O
The right to an impartial jury is guaranteed by both the
Sixth Amendment," as applied to the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment, 12 and by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.1 3 This right is a cornerstone of our jurisprudential
system. " "The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing vio-
lates even the minimal standards of due process."' 5 However,
the Mu'min majority held that content questioning, designed to
ensure that right, is not constitutionally mandated. 6 The ruling
is troublesome, particularly in light of the fact that previous
Court decisions have placed an affirmative burden on an accused
wanting a new trial to demonstrate that juror bias existed in the
first trial which rendered it unfair.'7 Without content question-
ing, an accused may not be able to effectively meet the burden
of demonstrating juror bias, and his guarantee of a fair trial may
be jeopardized.
The Mu'min decision marks a step backward in the Court's
consistent activism in protecting an accused from the prejudice
of adverse pretrial publicity. Until now, the Court espoused a
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1908.
10. See id.
11. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury ...." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
12. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 551 (1976) (quoting
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)).
13. The Fourteenth Amendment reads in part "No State shall make or enforce any
law ... nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law .. " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
14. See, e.g., Ross v. Massachusetts, 414 U.S. 1080, 1081 (1973); In re Murchison,
349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
15. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961).
16. Mu'min, 111 S. Ct. at 1908.
17. See, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961).
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philosophy of affirmative action in dealing with the potential for
prejudice caused by pretrial publicity. e Mu'min signifies a pos-
sible return to the Court's previous benign neglect of the
problem.19
This Note will examine Mu'min in light of previous deci-
sions that defined both the right to an impartial jury and the
extent of the voir dire necessary to ensure that right. Part II of
this Note will examine the history of the right to an impartial
jury and the role an adequate voir dire plays in ensuring juror
impartiality.20 Part III.A-D will provide the facts and procedural
history of Mu'min.2' Part III.E.1 will discuss the majority and
concurring opinions,22 and Part III.E.2 will discuss the dissent-
ing opinions.2 3 Part IV will analyze Mu'min by comparing it
with previous cases in which the right to an impartial jury was
considered. 24 Part V will conclude that while the Court acknowl-
edged an accused's right to an impartial jury, it failed to guaran-
tee a device necessary to ensure this impartiality, and placed the
burden of showing actual juror bias on the accused.2 5 Therefore,
the Mu'min decision failed to adequately protect an accused's
right to a fair trial before an impartial jury.2
II. Background
The Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantee a criminal defendant the
right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.2 7 This guarantee some-
times conflicts with the First Amendment guarantees of free
speech and free press.2 8 Media accounts of crimes and informa-
18. Sheldon Portman, The Defense of Fair Trial from Sheppard to Nebraska Press
Association: Benign Neglect to Affirmative Action and Beyond, 29 STAN. L. REv. 393, 416
(1977).
19. Id.
20. See infra notes 27-184 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 185-224 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 225-58 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 259-97 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 298-358 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 359-61 and accompanying text.
26. Id.
27. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
28. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press
.... .U.S  CONST. amend. I.
19931
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tion about the accused inevitably reach the pool of potential ju-
rors. If inflammatory information reaches this pool, the ac-
cused's right to a fair trial is potentially compromised.2 9 Despite
this risk, there are limitations on the extent to which a court can
prevent the media from publishing potentially prejudicial mate-
rial.3 0 This conflict is often referred to as the 'free press - fair
trial conflict.' 31
The potential for prejudice caused by pretrial publicity was
recognized as early as 1807.32 The problem has persisted since
that time and has been exacerbated by the advancement of
broadcast technology. Prejudicial pretrial publicity has been
most evident in so-called "sensational" cases, such as those of
Bruno Hauptman s4 and Dr. Sam Sheppard.3 5 More recent exam-
ples include the cases against General Manuel Noriega, 6 Wil-
liam Kennedy Smith,37 Mike Tyson,38 and the Los Angeles po-
lice officers accused of beating motorist Rodney King.3 9 These
cases illustrate the unrelenting growth of the prejudicial pretrial
publicity problem. An examination of the Court's decision in
Mu'min and its effect on the accused's right to a fair trial is
therefore timely.
29. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 727 (1961).
30. E.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558 (1976).
31. See, e.g., William H. Erickson, Fair Trial and Free Press: The Practical Di-
lemma, 29 STAN. L. REV. 485 (1977).
32. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 1, 49-52 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14692) (recog-
nizing the potential for prejudice caused by adverse pretrial publicity during Aaron
Burr's trial for treason).
33. Portman, supra note 18, at 395-96.
34. Id. at 396. Bruno Hauptman was accused of the kidnapping and murder of the
Charles Lindbergh baby. Id.
35. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); see infra notes 96-119 and accompa-
nying text.
36. Kevin J. O'Brien, Can Noriega Receive a Fair Trial?, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 17, 1990, at
1.
37. Fred Strasser, No Fair Trial, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 12, 1991, at 1.
38. E.g., Tyson Case Judge Won't Gag Lawyers, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 26, 1991, at B22;
Down for the Count, LEGAL TIMEs, Sept. 23, 1991, at 3.
39. Lois Timnick, Lawyers Ask Judge to Move Trial of Officers; King Case: One
Says a 'Lynch Mob Atmosphere' Exists. The Publicity Surrounding the Beating of a
Black Motorist Makes a Fair Trial Impossible for LAPD Sergeant and Patrolmen, They
Contend, L.A. TiMES, Apr. 23, 1991, at B1.
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A. The Pretrial Publicity Cases
A review of cases examining the risk to a fair trial caused by
pretrial publicity will be helpful to put the Mu'min decision in
perspective. Supreme Court decisions addressing pretrial public-
ity have recognized that such publicity may be so pervasive, or
so prejudicial, as to deprive an accused of a fair trial.4 0 For in-
stance, in Irvin v. Dowd," the Court was faced with the issue of
whether the high level of adverse pretrial publicity surrounding
the petitioner's trial deprived him of a fair trial.42 The Irvin
Court held that the extreme level of adverse publicity caused the
whole community to be presumed biased and therefore disquali-
fied from jury service.43
The trial court had conducted an extensive voir dire that
exposed substantial community bias against the petitioner.4 4 Of
the twelve jurors ultimately selected for the Irvin jury, eight had
previously formed an opinion that the petitioner was guilty, 45
but each said he could set aside his opinion and render an im-
partial verdict. 4" Irvin was convicted of murder and sentenced to
death.47 The Supreme Court reversed Irvin's conviction holding
that the level of adverse publicity rendered the whole commu-
40. See, e.g., infra notes 41-141, and accompanying text.
41. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
42. Id. at 719-20.
43. Id. at 727-28. Media accounts of the murder were substantial and included not
only the facts surrounding it, but also included reports that the petitioner had confessed
to the murder. Id. at 725. The accounts also contained information about Irvin's back-
ground, his juvenile crimes, his previous convictions for burglary and arson, and his court
martial. Id. The press also announced that Irvin failed a lie detector test and that he
offered to plead guilty in return for a 99 year sentence. Id. at 725-26.
44. Id. at 727. The trial court examined 430 potential jurors; 268 were excused for
cause because they held fixed opinions regarding the petitioner's guilt, and 103 were
excused because of their conscientious objection to imposing the death penalty. Id. In
addition, the petitioner used all of his peremptory challenges to have 20 more jurors
removed, and the state used all 10 of its peremptory challenges. Id. Of the 430 potential
jurors, 370 admitted having formed some opinion as to the petitioner's guilt. Id. The
Supreme Court later described the voir dire as revealing a "pattern of deep and bitter
prejudice." Id. Despite the extensive voir dire and the evident community bias, the trial
court denied Irvin's three motions for a change of venue, as well as his eight motions for
a continuance. Id. at 720.
45. Id. at 727.
46. Id. at 728.
47. Id. at 718. Six murders in and around Evansville, Indiana, were attributed to the
petitioner. Id. at 719.
5
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nity biased and thus ineligible for jury service.48 The Court held
that the trial court's finding of impartiality simply did not meet
constitutional standards."9 The Court reasoned that the right to
a fair trial guarantees an accused the right to a trial before an
impartial and indifferent jury,50 which had not occurred. The Ir-
vin Court, however, did not mandate that all jurors be totally
ignorant of the facts.5 1 Instead, the Court ruled that mere expo-
sure to pretrial publicity should not disqualify a potential juror
as long as he could discard his impressions or opinions and
render a verdict based solely on the evidence developed at
trial.52 "The adoption of such a rule, however, 'cannot foreclose
inquiry as to whether, in a given case, the application of that
rule works a deprivation of [an accused's] life or liberty without
due process of law.' ",53 According to the Court, the rule would
deprive an accused of due process if a juror was seated based
only on his assurance of impartiality when he, in fact, held an
opinion that would raise the presumption of partiality."
The determination of juror impartiality is a mixed question
of law and fact.5 The Court described the test for determining
when an acceptance of the juror's assurance of impartiality
would be a denial of due process as "whether the nature and
strength of the opinion formed are such as in law necessarily...
raise the presumption of partiality." 56 In Irvin, the Supreme
Court held that the trial court's findings of impartiality violated
the accused's due process rights:57
With his life at stake, it is not requiring too much that petitioner
be tried in an atmosphere undisturbed by so huge a wave of pub-
lic passion and by a jury other than one in which two-thirds of
the members admit, before hearing any testimony, to possessing a
48. Id. at 727-28.
49. Id. at 728.
50. Id. at 722. "In essence, the right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally ac-
cused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, 'indifferent' jurors. The failure to accord an
accused a fair hearing violates even the minimal standards of due process." Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 723.
53. Id. (quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941)).
54. Id. at 724.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 723.
57. Id. at 728.
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belief in his guilt.58
The Irvin Court concluded by acknowledging that under certain
circumstances, a mere declaration of impartiality is insufficient
because extensive publicity may lead to the presumption that
the whole community is biased.59 The extensive publicity sur-
rounding Irvin's arrest warranted such a presumption."
Irvin is also notable for the extent of the voir dire used to
establish that the proceedings were unfair. The record of the
trial court's extensive voir dire6' was instrumental in assisting
the Supreme Court's review of the trial court's legal findings of
impartiality.2 This voir dire afforded the petitioner the oppor-
tunity to demonstrate the existence of disqualifying juror bias.
The Supreme Court has also held that the very nature of
the pretrial publicity may warrant per se juror disqualification.
In Rideau v. Louisiana,63 the Court was presented with a case in
which a petitioner's detailed confession 4 was broadcast on tele-
vision three times before his trial65 and was seen by three mem-
bers of the jury that convicted him.66 Despite this, the peti-
tioner's challenges for cause of these jurors as well as his request
for a change of venue were denied. 7
The Supreme Court held that the trial court's refusal to
grant the motion for a change of venue denied the petitioner due
process of law.68 The Court held that potential jurors who saw
the taped confession could not be impartial.6 9 Reasoning that
58. Id.
59. Id. at 727-28.
60. Id. at 728.
61. Id. at 720.
62. See generally id. at 727.
63. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
64. The petitioner was charged with armed robbery, kidnapping and murder. Id. at
724. After his arrest, local authorities elicited a filmed confession from the petitioner. Id.
at 725. The taped confession showed Rideau surrounded by police officers and being
asked leading questions by the sheriff. Id. Rideau had no lawyer and may not have been
aware of what was transpiring. Id.
65. The confession was broadcast on television three times in the Calcasieu Parish
of Louisiana. Id. Of the 150,000 parish residents, a minimum of 53,000 saw a broadcast
of the confession. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 726.
69. "[T]he conclusion cannot be avoided that this spectacle, to the tens of
19931
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the community had been inundated with highly prejudicial and
disqualifying information, the Court stated that a trial held in
the community would be "but a hollow formality."70 Due process
required that Rideau's trial be held in a community that had not
been exposed to Rideau's confession.7 A decade later, in Mur-
phy v. Florida,72 the Supreme Court affirmed a conviction in
which it had to consider whether a juror's declaration of impar-
tiality was dispositive.73 The petitioner claimed that his trial for
assault and breaking and entering had been tainted by extensive
media coverage concerning his lifestyle and criminal history.7"
The eight jurors had claimed they could be impartial, despite
the fact that some knew of the petitioner's past crimes. 75
The Murphy Court held that juror assurances of impartial-
ity were not dispositive. 76 Furthermore, the burden of demon-
strating the existence of a disqualifying bias was found to rest
with the petitioner.77 Upon review of the voir dire, the Court
found that no indicia of juror partiality had existed in the se-
lected jurors.78 The Court distinguished Murphy from Irvin and
Rideau,7' noting that the atmosphere in the Murphy community
had not been sufficiently inflammatory to raise a presumption of
community partiality.80
thousands of people who saw and heard it, in a real sense was Rideau's trial - at which
he pleaded guilty to murder." Id. (emphasis omitted). "The kangaroo court proceedings
in this case involved a ... real deprivation of due process of law." Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 727.
72. 421 U.S. 794 (1975).
73. Id. at 797.
74. The petitioner had gained notoriety for his part in the 1964 theft of the Star of
India sapphire. Id. at 795. He was also the subject of continuing press interest because of
his flamboyant lifestyle. Id. In addition, while awaiting trial on the burglary and assault
charges, he was convicted of murder and was indicted for conspiracy to transport stolen
securities, both of which drew extensive media coverage. Id. at 796.
75. The eight jurors chosen were selected from a panel of 78. Of these 78, 30 were
excused for personal reasons, 20 were peremptorily challenged, and 20 were excused for
cause because they had prejudged the petitioner. Id.
76. Id. at 800.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 803.
79. Id. at 798-99. The Court also distinguished Murphy from Sheppard v. Maxwell,
384 U.S. 333 (1966). Id. See infra notes 98-120, and accompanying text.
80. Murphy, 421 U.S. at 802.
[Vol. 13:605
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol13/iss2/11
MU'MIN v. VIRGINIA
Most recently in Patton v. Yount,8" the Court reviewed the
effect of publicity on the fairness of a murder retrial. The peti-
tioner had been convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.82
The conviction was subsequently overturned and the case was
remanded for a new trial.8 3 The retrial was held four years after
the first,84 and again the petitioner was convicted. 5 On appeal,
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit set aside the retrial
verdict after finding that adverse pretrial publicity surrounding
the retrial deprived the petitioner of a fair trial.86
The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the convic-
tion,87 holding that the relevant inquiry must be whether the ju-
ror held an opinion that would render him unable to deliver an
impartial verdict.8 8 The Court was convinced that the retrial's
extensive voir dire had provided adequate support for the trial
court's finding of impartiality.8 In addition, the Court found
that the level and effect of the publicity was insufficient to dis-
qualify the community as a whole.90 Moreover, the passage of
time between the trials had negated much of the pretrial public-
ity's effect.91
Of particular significance in Patton is the extent of the re-
trial voir dire,9" and its usefulness not only in rooting out bias,
81. 467 U.S. 1025 (1984).
82. The petitioner, a math teacher, was convicted by a Pennsylvania state court af-
ter confessing to the murder of an eighteen year old high school student. Id. at 1027.
83. The conviction was overturned because Yount had inadequate notice of his right
to an attorney prior to his confession. Id.
84. Id. at 1032. At the retrial, the trial court conducted an extensive voir dire lasting
10 days, during which 292 veniremen were examined. Id. at 1027. The petitioner was
again convicted of first degree murder. His petition for a writ of habeas corpus was de-
nied by a federal district court. Id. at 1028.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1029. The circuit court believed that because 77 percent of the potential
jurors examined had indicated exposure to pretrial information, the assurances of impar-
tiality made by the jurors eventually seated should not have been believed. Id. at 1029-
30.
87. Id. at 1040.
88. Id. at 1035. "[Dlid a juror swear that he could set aside any opinion he might
hold and decide the case on the evidence, and should the juror's protestation of imparti-
ality . . . [be] believed?" Id. at 1036.
89. Id. at 1038.
90. Id. at 1033.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1034 n.10.
1993]
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but also in providing a solid foundation for appellate review."
The Court recognized that voir dire is an effective tool for iden-
tifying bias."' The Court closely reviewed the voir dire testi-
mony9" before according deference to the trial court's finding of
impartiality.9
B. Affirmative Action
Until the Supreme Court's decision in Sheppard v. Max-
well,9 7 the Court had addressed violations of an accused's right
to a fair trial due to pretrial publicity by merely reversing the
conviction and remanding the case for retrial.9 8 In Sheppard,
the Court not only reversed the .conviction, but strongly urged
the adoption of judicial procedural devices to combat the
prejudice caused by pretrial publicity at its inception. 9
Sheppard involved the sensational murder trial of Dr. Sam
Sheppard. °00 After Sheppard's wife was murdered, 10 1 media pub-
licity implicated Sheppard and called for his arrest.1"" Once he
had been formally charged,10 3 the intensity of the media cover-
age heightened.1 04 During the voir dire, eleven of the twelve
eventual jurors testified to having learned of the case through
the media.10 At the trial, media representatives flooded the
courtroom,10 and the jurors were not protected from their influ-
93. Id. at 1038.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1039.
96. Id. at 1038.
97. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
98. Id. at 363.
99. Id. at 361-62.
100. Sheppard claimed to have been sleeping in another room when he heard his
wife cry out. He ran to her room and saw a "form," with which he struggled until a blow
to his head rendered him unconscious. When he regained consciousness, he found his
wife dead. He saw the "form" running away and he chased it to the lake where another
struggle ensued and he was again knocked unconscious. Id. at 336. Sheppard was repeat-
edly questioned, was asked to take a lie detector test, and was subjected to a coroner's
inquest, all without an attorney. Id. at 338.
101. Mrs. Sheppard was bludgeoned to death in her bedroom. Id. at 335-36.
102. Id. at 340-41. The articles also detailed Sheppard's lack of cooperation, his per-
formance at the inquest, and his refusal to take a lie detector test. Id.
103. Id. at 341.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 345.
106. Id. at 343. Most of the seats in the courtroom were assigned to the media. A
[Vol. 13:605
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ence during the trial.1 1 7 Sheppard was convicted of murder.1 0 8
In reviewing the denial of a writ of habeas corpus,109 the Su-
preme Court held that Sheppard had been denied a fair trial.110
The Court began its review by examining and commenting on
the role of the press in the context of criminal trials, stating:"'
"The press does not simply publish information about trials but
guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police,
prosecutors and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny
and criticism." ' 2 The Court, however, cautioned that the me-
dia's presence in the criminal justice process can have deleteri-
ous effects."13 The Court noted "the requirement that the jury's
verdict be based on evidence received in open court, not from
outside sources," assures the fair administration of justice.1 4
In reaching its conclusion,' 5 the Court recognized that the
trial court's failure to protect Sheppard against the influence of
pretrial publicity alone did not constitute a deprivation of due
process." ' However, the pretrial publicity in conjunction with
the conditions at trial did amount to a violation of due pro-
cess.11 7 Specifically, the trial court had failed to utilize proce-
dures designed to insulate jurors from outside influence once the
large table set up inside the bar accommodated even more media personnel. Id. The
media conducted live broadcasts from the courthouse. Id. In addition, daily testimony of
the witnesses was printed verbatim in local newspapers. Id. at 344.
107. Id. at 347.
108. Id. at 335.
109. A writ of habeas corpus or habeas corpus ad subjiciendum is a writ command-
ing the person detaining a prisoner to produce the body of the petitioner. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 709-10 (6th ed. 1990). "[T]he purpose of [the writ] is to test the legality of
the detention or imprisonment; not whether he is guilty or innocent." The availability of
the writ is guaranteed by Article I, § 9 of the Constitution. Id.
110. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 354-55.
111. In addition, the Court stated: "The principle that justice cannot survive behind
walls of silence has long been reflected in the 'Anglo-American distrust for secret tri-
als.' " Id. at 349 (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268 (1948)). "A responsible press has
always been considered as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially
in the criminal field." Id. at 350.
112. Id.
113. Id. "Legal trials are not like elections, to be won through the use of the meet-
ing-hall, the radio, and the newspaper." Id. (quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252,
271 (1941)).
114. Id. at 350-51.
115. Id. at 363.
116. Id. at 354.
117. Id. at 355, 362.
1993]
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trial began. 118
The Court in Sheppard issued a stern warning about the
dangers of pretrial publicity in a criminal proceeding:
[U]nfair and prejudicial news comment on pending trials has be-
come increasingly prevalent. Due process requires that the ac-
cused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from outside influ-
ences. Given the pervasiveness of modern communications and
the difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of
the jurors, the trial courts must take strong measures to ensure
that the balance is never weighed against the accused."9
The Sheppard Court put the onus on the trial court because its
own power is limited to reversing convictions obtained through
unfair trials; such power is inadequate to solve the pretrial pub-
licity problem.120 "[T]he cure lies in those remedial measures
that will prevent prejudice at its inception. The courts must take
such steps by rule and regulation that will protect their
processes from prejudicial outside interferences."''
In reversing and remanding the case, the Sheppard Court
promulgated a doctrine of increased judicial activism in prevent-
ing the possibility of prejudice at its inception. 2 ' This act is
considered to have been the birth of affirmative action in
preventing pretrial publicity from infecting a criminal trial.123
A decade later, this pronouncement was reinforced. In Ne-
braska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, the Court, in striking down the
trial court's imposition of restrictions on press accounts, 23 again
recommended procedural safeguards to protect the accused's
118. Id. at 358. Procedures that could have ensured a fair trial include assigning the
trial judge control of the use of the courtroom and the courthouse by media personnel.
Id. The court could have insulated witnesses from outside influences. Id. at 359. The
trial judge could have made efforts to control the release of information. Id. In particu-
lar, the court could have warned the media to check the accuracy of its stories, and the
judge could have prevented the lawyers, the police, and the coroner from revealing cer-
tain information. Id. at 360.
119. Id. at 362 (emphasis added).
120. Id. at 363.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Portman, supra note 18, at 405.
124. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
125. Id. at 570.
[Vol. 13:605
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right to a fair trial. 2 6 Nebraska Press arose after a trial court
imposed prior restraint 2 " on speech to combat the effects of ad-
verse pretrial publicity.12 8 The defendant was charged with mur-
der, 2" and the crime had drawn substantial media attention
both locally and nationally. °30
Responding to requests by both parties, the trial judge en-
tered a restrictive order pertaining to media coverage before and
during the trial.' The Nebraska Supreme Court modified the
order,3 2 prohibiting reports of any confession, or any other in-
formation "strongly implicative" of the accused. 133
The Supreme Court refused to uphold the use of prior re-
straint on speech in Nebraska Press,"'4 noting that prior re-
straint on speech is the "most serious and least tolerable in-
fringement on First Amendment rights."'3 5 However, the Court
concluded that devices other than a restraining order might have
126. Id. at 563-64.
127. "A system of 'prior restraint' is any scheme which gives public officials the
power to deny use of a forum in advance of its actual expression." BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 1194 (6th ed. 1990). In Nebraska Press, the prior restraint on speech limited what
the press could publish about the case and trial. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 542. Prior
restraint on speech is also known as a "gag" order. Portman, supra note 18, at 409.
128. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 543.
129. Id. at 542. Irwin Charles Simants was charged with murdering the six members
of the Kellie family in the small town of Sutherland, Nebraska. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 543. The restrictive order, which applied only until the jury was impan-
eled, prohibited members of the press from reporting on five subject areas: the contents
of Simants' confession, the nature of Simants' statements to others, the contents of the
note Simants wrote the night of the crime, aspects of the medical testimony, and the
identity of the victims of the alleged sexual assault. Id. at 543-44. Disclosure of the na-
ture of the order itself was also prohibited. Id. at 544.
132. Id. at 545.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 570.
135. Id. at 559. While First Amendment rights are not absolute, there is a presump-
tion against prior restraints on those rights. Id. at 570. In this case, the presumption of
invalidity of the restraining order was not overcome. Id.
The Court reviewed the following factors to determine whether the media re-
straining order was supportable. Those factors were: the nature and extent of pretrial
news coverage, the likelihood that other measures would mitigate the harm caused by
unrestrained pretrial publicity, and the effectiveness of a restraining order in protecting
the accused. Id. at 562. The Court affirmed the trial court's determination that adverse
pretrial publicity existed which might have affected the accused's right to a fair trial. Id.
at 563.
13
PACE LAW REVIEW
adequately protected the accused.136 It went on to list five de-
vices that could be used to protect an accused from a trial in-
fected by outside influences: 137 change of venue; postponement
of the trial; extensive questioning of the prospective jurors to
weed out those with fixed opinions; emphatic jury instructions
on the duty to decide the issues solely on evidence presented at
trial; and jury sequestration.138
The Nebraska Press Court determined that the heavy bur-
den needed to justify the prior restraint was not met because
there was no indication that one of the less restrictive alterna-
tives to prior restraint would not have worked.139 The Court also
found it significant that prior Court decisions reversing state
court convictions have held that the use of less restrictive de-
vices would have made a critical difference in assuring the ac-
cused a fair trial. 40
The preceding cases identify the relation of pretrial public-
ity to the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial and illustrate
recurring themes. First, voir dire is an effective device for identi-
fying juror bias. The trial courts in Irvin, Murphy, and Patton
utilized an extensive voir dire to assess potential juror bias. " In
addition, in both Sheppard and Nebraska Press, the Supreme
Court urged the use of voir dire to weed out bias at its inception
and thereby aid in securing a fair trial." ' Second, voir dire testi-
mony is crucial for appellate review of a case. " An extensive
voir dire provides an adequate record of the trial court's findings
of impartiality and allows for a review of such findings as a mat-
ter of law. For instance, in Irvin, reviewing the voir dire led to
the presumption that the whole community was biased.' Third,
reversing convictions obtained through unfair trials is insuffi-
136. Id. at 565. In addition, the Court found it significant that there was no assur-
ance that the prior restraint on publication would have worked. Id. at 569.
137. Id. at 563-64.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 565.
140. Id. at 569 (citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966), Rideau v.
Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963) and Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961)).
141. See supra notes 44, 78, 89 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 121, 137, 138 and accompanying text.
143. See generally Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984); Murphy v. Florida, 421
U.S. 794 (1975); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
144. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
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cient; trial courts should take affirmative action to protect the
accused from prejudice at its inception.4 5 An extensive, probing
voir dire is a procedural device that allows the trial courts to
satisfy the Supreme Court's edict."" Lastly, the voir dire is a
procedural device that assists a petitioner in meeting his burden
of showing actual prejudice at either the trial or appellate level.
C. The Racial Bias Analogy
In addition to deciding cases involving the effect of pretrial
publicity on the right to a fair trial, the Supreme Court has also
decided several cases involving racial bias and its effect on that
right. Such cases have examined the adequacy of the voir dire.
These cases reveal that circumstances can exist in which the risk
of prejudice adversely affecting a trial mandates an inquiry into
racial bias during the voir dire.147
For instance, in Aldridge v. United States,"" a case decided
under the Supreme Court's supervisory power, ""e the Court re-
versed a petitioner's murder conviction because the trial court
had refused to allow adequate questioning on the subject of ra-
cial bias during the voir dire.150 The petitioner, a black man, had
been convicted by an all white jury"' for the murder of a white
police officer.1 52 In reaching its conclusion, the Court examined
previous decisions and recognized the propriety of asking ques-
tions regarding racial bias when the defendant is a minority.153
The Court held that the risk of racial prejudice was not so
145. See generally Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
146. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 562-64.
147. See infra notes 148-84 and accompanying text.
148. 283 U.S. 308 (1931).
149. Mu'min, 111 S. Ct. at 1903. The Supreme Court has supervisory power over
cases tried in federal courts. Id. The Court may reverse a lower court even if the error is
not of constitutional magnitude. Id. at 1904.
150. Aldridge, 283 U.S. at 315. During jury selection, the trial court refused the peti-
tioner's request that the potential jurors be questioned on the existence of racial bias. Id.
at 310.
151. Id. at 310.
152. Id. at 309.
153. Id. at 313. The Court concluded "[t]he right to examine jurors on the voir dire
as to the existence of a disqualifying state of mind, has been upheld with respect to other
races than the black race, and in relation to religious and other prejudices of a serious
character." Id.
19931
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remote as to justify the trial court's refusal to allow questioning
on the subject."" The Court concluded by stating:
[w]e think that it would be far more injurious to permit it to be
thought that persons entertaining a disqualifying prejudice were
allowed to serve as jurors and that inquiries designed to elicit the
fact of disqualification were barred. No surer way could be de-
vised to bring the processes of justice into disrepute. 55
The Supreme Court has also relied on constitutional
grounds to overturn convictions because of the failure to ques-
tion on racial bias during the voir dire. For instance, in Ham v.
South Carolina,'156 a case tried in a state court, 157 the trial court
refused to allow petitioner's counsel to question potential jurors
on racial bias despite the fact that the petitioner was a black
civil rights worker.'58 The Court held this refusal violated the
essential fairness requirement of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 159 and warranted reversal of the con-
viction. 60 The Court acknowledged that while questions relating
to racial bias are constitutionally mandated, the trial court re-
tains discretion over the number and form of the questions.''
Despite the Ham Court's recognition that failure to ask ra-
cial bias questions may violate the Constitution when racial bias
threatens trial fairness, the Supreme Court in Ristaino v. Ross"2
made it clear that such an inquiry is not required in all interra-
cial cases. 63 In Ristaino, the Supreme Court upheld the convic-
tion of a black petitioner for assaulting a white security guard
despite the fact that the trial court had refused to allow voir dire
154. Id. at 314.
155. Id. at 315.
156. 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
157. Id. The petitioner was a young, black civil rights worker who claimed his arrest
for marihuana possession was a frame-up by police who were "out to get him." Id. at 525.
158. Id. In addition to the racial bias questions, the petitioner also requested ques-
tions relating to possible prejudice towards bearded men and possible prejudice caused
by pretrial publicity. Id. at 525-26.
159. Id. at 527. Although the Court held that failure to ask racial bias questions
violated the petitioners due process rights, the failure to ask questions relating to bias
against bearded men and bias caused by pretrial publicity was not a constitutional viola-
tion. Id. at 527-28.
160. Id. at 529.
161. Id. at 527.
162. 424 U.S. 589 (1976).
163. Id. at 590.
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questions regarding possible racial bias.164 The Court restated its
prior holding in Ham that questioning of potential jurors about
racial prejudice is constitutionally mandated in circumstances
that present an impermissible risk to a fair trial. 165 However, in
affirming the conviction, the Court distinguished the facts of
Ristaino from those in Ham, and found that the essential fair-
ness requirements of due process did not mandate racial
prejudice questioning in Ristaino. 6 Although the case involved
an interracial crime, unlike Ham, racial issues were not "inextri-
cably bound up with the conduct of the trial,"' 67 and an inquiry
was therefore not constitutionally required."6 '
The Ristaino Court did not state expressly what circum-
stances necessitate a racial bias inquiry during voir dire. How-
ever, the Supreme Court in Turner v. Murray"6 9 made it clear
that a capital trial ordinarily prompts such an inquiry.'7 0 Turner
involved the trial of a black man for the murder of a white jew-
elry store owner. 17 During the voir dire, the trial judge refused
to ask any of the petitioner's proposed questions regarding racial
bias. '7  Instead, only general impartiality questions were
asked.173 The jury convicted Turner of murder,'17  and recom-
mended a death sentence,' 5 which was subsequently imposed by
the trial court.'7 6
After reviewing the denial of habeas corpus relief, the Su-
preme Court vacated Turner's death sentence.'7 7 The Court
ruled that the additional fact that Turner was convicted of a
capital crime distinguished it from Ristaino, and presented a
164. Id.
165. Id. at 595.
166. Id. at 595-97.
167. Id. at 597.
168. Id.
169. 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
170. Id. at 33-36. A capital case or crime is "[o]ne in or for which death penalty
may, but need not necessarily, be imposed." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 209 (6th ed. 1990).
171. Turner, 476 U.S. at 30.
172. Id. at 30-31.
173. Id. at 31. The judge asked the general impartiality questions before any of the
jurors were aware that it was an interracial crime. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 37.
1993]
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"special circumstance," which mandated the requested in-
quiry.178 The Court pronounced a per se rule that a capital de-
fendant charged with an interracial crime is entitled to have
questions relating to racial prejudice asked during the voir
dire. 179 However, the Court noted that the trial court maintains
discretion over the form and number of the questions, and the
decision whether to examine jurors collectively or individually. 8 '
The Court described this rule as "minimally intrusive.' 18'
The preceding cases dealing with the extent of voir dire
questioning necessary to protect an accused from racial
prejudice reveal recurring themes. Questions regarding racial
bias are required when a likelihood exists that racial prejudice
will pose a substantial risk to the defendant's right to a fair
trial.182 The rule applies not only to racial bias, but also to
"other prejudices of a serious character."'8 3 Furthermore, a capi-
tal crime is a special circumstance demanding additional
protection. 184
III. Facts and Procedure
A. The Crime
In September 1988, while serving a forty-eight year sentence
in a Virginia state prison for a 1973 first-degree murder convic-
tion, ' Dawud Majid Mu'min was assigned to a work detail su-
pervised by the Virginia Department of Transportation
(VDOT).'86 During a lunch break, Mu'min escaped over a fence
and walked to a nearby shopping center, '87 where he entered
178. Id. at 33. The Court found that the trial judge failed to adequately protect the
petitioner's constitutional right to an impartial jury, and concluded that there was an
unacceptable risk that racial prejudice may have infected the petitioner's sentencing. Id.
at 36.
179. Id. at 36-37.
180. Id. at 37.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 313 (1931).
184. See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 33 (1986).
185. Mu'min, 111 S. Ct. at 1901.
186. Id. While assigned to the VDOT, Mu'min used the grinding equipment in the
VDOT shop to sharpen a metal spike and attach it to a wooden handle. Brief for Re-
spondent at 2, Mu'min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991) (No. 90-5193).
187. Respondent's Brief at 2, Mu'min (No. 90-5193).
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Dale City Floors and repeatedly stabbed the store owner Gladys
Nopwasky with a sharpened spike he had fashioned earlier. 188
After the attack, Mu'min took four dollars in change and fled
the store,'89 returned to wipe off his fingerprints, and again
fled. l90 He then discarded the sharpened spike and his bloody
shirt and returned to the work detail.' 9 ' A customer discovered
Nopwasky partially undressed and lying on the floor.'92 Rescue
efforts failed and Nopwasky bled to death.'93 The autopsy re-
vealed that she had been stabbed or cut sixteen times about the
face, neck, chest, and arm.' 94
B. The Publicity
The crime generated substantial media attention.9 5 It re-
ceived front page coverage not only because of its shocking na-
ture, but because of its similarity to the crimes committed by
Willie Horton, the Massachusetts inmate whose crime spree dur-
ing a weekend furlough became a controversial issue during the
1988 presidential campaign.'96 Press accounts contained sub-
stantial information about Mu'min that was not admitted at
trial, 9 ' such as information about his 1973 murder conviction,' 8
188. Id. Mu'min claimed that after he entered the store, a heated argument over
prices ensued, during which time Nopwasky screamed at him and called him names. He
then slapped her and she kicked him in the groin. As he fell to the floor he pulled down
her pants. Nopwasky then attacked him with a knife. He then used the sharpened spike
to stab her. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Mu'min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991) (No. 90-
5193).
189. Petitioner's Brief at 4, Mu'min (No. 90-5193) (Mu'min claimed he took the
money and fled the store in order to get help).
190. Id. at 2.
191. Mu'min, 111 S. Ct. at 1901.
192. Respondent's Brief at 2, Mu'min (No. 90-5193).
193. Id. at 2-3.
194. Id. at 3. In addition, Nopwasky had several blunt force injuries consistent with
punches to the face. Id.
195. Mu'min, 111 S. Ct. at 1901.
196. Willie Horton was a Massachusetts inmate who raped a Maryland woman while
on a weekend furlough. That incident sparked a heated controversy during the 1988
Presidential campaign. See Engleberg, Bush, His Disavowed Backers And a Very Potent
Attack Ad, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1988, at Al.
197. Petitioner's Brief at 5, Mu'min (No. 90-5193).
198. Id. at 6-7. The accounts not only related the facts of his murder conviction, but
also included editorials on the unavailability of the death penalty at the time of the
conviction. Id.
19931
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his prison record,199 and his juvenile record. 00 The accounts also
indicated that Nopwasky might have been raped. 0' In addition,
several accounts indicated Mu'min had confessed to the
murder. 2 '
C. The Trial
Before trial, Mu'min moved for a change of venue,20 3 sub-
mitting forty-seven newspaper articles to illustrate the extent of
the media coverage. °4 The trial judge deferred ruling on the mo-
tion until an attempt to seat a jury was made.20 5 He also denied
Mu'min's request for an individual voir dire and ordered that it
be conducted in groups, and then in panels of four if neces-
sary.20 Mu'min submitted sixty-four proposed voir dire ques-
tions.2 °7 The judge refused to ask any of the proposed questions
relating to the content of the information to which the potential
jurors had been exposed or the content of any discussions they
may have had about the case. 28 The judge allowed only ques-
199. Id. at 5-6. The accounts related that Mu'min was awaiting trial for beating
another inmate, that he had 23 other prison rule violations, and that he had been re-
jected for parole six times. Id.
200. Id. at 7.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 8. The news stories about Mu'min's confession made headlines such as
"Murderer Confesses to Killing Woman" and "Inmate said to admit killing." Mu'min,
111 S. Ct. at 1911 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
203. Mu'min, 111 S. Ct. at 1901.
204. Id.-
205. Id. at 1902.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. The proposed but rejected questions were:
31. Have you acquired any information about this case, from the newspapers, tel-
evision, conversations or any other source?
32. What have you seen, read or heard about this case?
33. From whom or what did you get this information?
34. When and where did you get this information?
35. Have you discussed this case with anyone?
36. With whom?
37. When and where?
38. What did you discuss?
39. Have you formed an opinion or conclusion about this case?
40. What is it?
41. Has anyone expressed any opinion about this case to you?
42. Who? What? When? Where?
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tions on whether the jurors had received information, and if
they had, whether it would affect their impartiality. °0
The trial court began the voir dire by questioning a panel of
twenty-six jurors.21 ° Sixteen admitted exposure to the public-
ity,21 but when asked whether they could remain impartial,"
only one admitted an inability to do so and was excused for
cause.2 13 Mu'min's request that all jurors admitting exposure be
excused was denied.2 14 The court conducted further voir dire in
panels of four, again asking jurors whether they had been ex-
posed, and if so, whether they could nonetheless remain impar-
tial.21 5 Eight of the twelve jurors ultimately chosen had been ex-
posed to pretrial publicity, 16 but none admitted having formed
Petitioner's Brief at 10-11, Mu'min (No. 90-5193).
209. Petitioner's Brief at 12-13, Mu'min (No. 90-5193). The questions allowed by
the court were:
Have any of you acquired any information about the
offense, the alleged offense, or the accused from the
news media or any other source?
Is there anyone who has acquired any information
from the news media or from any other source?
Id. at 12.
If the jurors admitted exposure, the following questions were asked:
Would the information that you heard, received, or read
from whatever source, would that information affect your
impartiality in this case?
Is there anyone that would say what you've read,
seen, heard, or whatever information you may have
acquired from whatever the source would affect your
impartiality so that you could not be impartial?
Considering what the ladies and gentlemen who have answered
in the affirmative have heard about this case,
do you believe that you can enter the Jury box with an
open mind and wait until the entire case is presented
before reaching a fixed opinion or conclusion as to the
guilt or innocence of the accused?
Id. at 12-13.
210. Mu'min, 111 S. Ct. at 1902.
211. Id.
212. See supra note 209.
213. Mu'min, 111 S. Ct. at 1902.
214. Petitioner's Brief at 13-14, Mu'min (No. 90-5193).
215. Mu'min, 111 S. Ct. at 1903. Several more jurors were excused for a variety of
reasons including equivocation as to whether they could remain impartial, bias toward
the Islamic faith, and an inability to impose the death penalty. Id. In addition, the pros-
ecution and the defense each peremptorily challenged six jurors. Id.
216. Id.
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an opinion.217 The jury convicted Mu'min and recommended the
death penalty.218 The trial court accepted the jury's recommen-
dation, and sentenced Mu'min to death.219
D. Appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia, in a four to three
decision, rejected Mu'min's contention that the failure to ask
the proposed voir dire questions violated his constitutional
rights.220 The majority held that although content questions may
be asked, the Constitution does not mandate it. 21 The dissent-
ers argued that failure to ask content questions, 2 combined
with the fact that a juror's impartiality could be inferred from
his silence, deprived Mu'min of a fair trial.223 Certiorari was
granted by the United States Supreme Court.224
E. The Supreme Court's Decision
1. Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, 22  began
by examining the racial bias cases. 2 6 The Court first examined
cases tried in the federal courts, over which the Supreme Court
has supervisory power.227 The Court examined Connors v.
United States,22 8 Aldridge v. United States,229 and Rosales-Lo-
pez v. United States,30 which had all held that in instances in
which racial prejudice presents the risk of an unfair trial, the
trial court must conduct voir dire questions designed to cover
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Mu'min v. Commonwealth, 389 S.E.2d 886, 893 (Va. 1990).
221. Id. at 893.
222. Id. at 899 (Whiting, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 901.
224. Mu'min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 242 (1990).
225. The majority opinion was joined by Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Sou-
ter. Justice O'Connor also filed a separate concurring opinion. Mu'min, 111 S. Ct. at
1901.
226. See supra notes 147-81 and accompanying text.
227. Mu'min, 111 S. Ct. at 1903.
228. 158 U.S. 408 (1895).
229. 283 U.S. 308 (1931).
230. 451 U.S. 182 (1981).
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the subject of racial bias and the possibility that potential jurors
will have a disqualifying prejudice.2"1 Although these decisions
required an inquiry into racial bias, they were decided under the
Supreme Court's supervisory power rather than on constitu-
tional grounds.232
Justice Rehnquist then examined three racial bias cases
tried in state courts2 3 where the Supreme Court is limited to
correcting constitutional violations.23" The Court examined Ham
v. South Carolina,"5 Ristaino v. Ross,2"36 and Turner v. Mur-
ray.237 Those cases held that in circumstances when racial
prejudice presents an impermissible risk to a fair trial, the Con-
stitution requires an inquiry into possible prejudice during the
voir dire.2 8
The Court identified the two recurrent themes from these
cases: an inquiry must be made into possible prejudice when it
presents an unacceptable risk to a fair trial, and, regardless of
the circumstances, the trial court has great latitude in con-
ducting the voir dire.2 39 After identifying the racial bias themes,
Rehnquist examined cases in which pretrial publicity raised an
issue of a trial's fairness.240 Because Mu'min had relied so heav-
ily on Irvin v. Dowd, the Court reviewed it carefully." 1 While
concluding that Irvin was instructive, the majority distinguished
it from Mu'min by noting that Irvin had stemmed from the de-
nial of a change of venue motion rather than from the denial of
the right to pose content questions during voir dire.2" 2 Further-
more, eight of the Irvin jurors had formed an opinion as to the
petitioner's guilt, while no Mu'min jurors had professed forming
a disqualifying opinion. 43 In addition, while conceding that the
231. Mu'min, 111 S. Ct. at 1903-04.
232. Id. at 1904.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See supra notes 156-68 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 162-68 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 169-76 and accompanying text.
238. Mu'min, 111 S. Ct. at 1904.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1906.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 1907.
243. Id.
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level of publicity surrounding Mu'min's trial was substantial, the
Court noted that it did not reach the level that it had in Irvin.
Thus, there could be no presumption of community bias in
Mu'min.2" The majority also reviewed its holding in Patton v.
Yount, that adverse pretrial publicity can create a presumption
of partiality in the community, and decided that the substantial
publicity in Mu'min did not reach the level necessary to disqual-
ify the community.2 4
The Court also rejected Mu'min's reliance on the American
Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice.24  These stan-
dards require that a juror be subject to challenge for cause re-
gardless of his state of mind on impartiality once he admits ex-
posure to inflammatory material or inadmissible evidence.2 7
The Court held this to be a stricter standard than the Constitu-
tion requires. 4 s The Court further supported its position by not-
ing that content questioning during voir dire may have detri-
mental effects, such as cost and time consumption, as well as the
possibility of tainting previously unexposed jurors with adverse
pretrial information.24 e
The Court relied on the wide discretion given to the trial
court in conducting voir dire in the area of pretrial publicity in
upholding Mu'min's conviction.2 ° In both the racial bias and
the pretrial publicity cases, the Court has consistently empha-
sized the trial court's wide discretion in conducting the voir dire
244. Id.
245. Id. at 1907.
246. Id. at 1907-08. Standard 8-3.5(a) requires:
If there is a substantial possibility that individual jurors will be ineligible to serve
because of exposure to potentially prejudicial material .... questioning shall be
conducted for the purpose of determining what the prospective juror has read and
heard about the case and how any exposure has affected that person's attitude
toward the trial ....
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 8-3.5(a) (2d ed. 1980 & Supp. 1986).
247. Mu'min , 111 S. Ct. at 1907.
248. Id. Standard 8-3.5(b) reads in part:
A prospective juror who has been exposed to and remembers reports of highly
significant information, such as the existence or contents of a confession, or other
incriminating matters that may be inadmissible in evidence, or substantial
amounts of inflammatory material, shall be subject to challenge for cause without
regard to the juror's testimony as to state of mind.
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 8-3.5(b) (2d ed. 1980 & Supp. 1986).
249. Mu'min, 111 S. Ct. at 1905.
250. Id. at 1906.
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and evaluating juror impartiality. The Court reasoned that be-
cause the trial judge sits in the locale where the publicity is cen-
tered, he is best able to evaluate the extent and impact of the
pretrial publicity and to assess the jurors' impartiality. 5 ' This
supports the deference to be afforded to the judge's
determination.152
While acknowledging that content questioning during the
voir dire would be helpful in assessing impartiality, the majority
held that to be constitutionally mandated, the "trial court's fail-
ure to ask these questions must render the defendant's trial fun-
damentally unfair. ' 253 The Court reasoned that although con-
tent questioning might be a better rule, it is not constitutionally
required, 25 ' and thus, not mandated by the Supreme Court. In
Mu'min, the majority held that the trial court's findings of im-
partiality comported with constitutional standards. 55
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor framed the is-
sue as whether the trial court had erred in accepting the jurors'
pronouncements of impartiality without first asking them con-
tent questions.256 Justice O'Connor, agreeing with Rehnquist,
believed that because the trial judge sits in the locale where the
publicity is likely to be greatest, he is fully aware of its extent,
nature, and effect, and his findings of impartiality are thus enti-
tled to deference despite a lack of content questions.151 Justice
O'Connor held that content questioning is not indispensable in
evaluating juror impartiality and therefore, is not required by
the Sixth Amendment. 58
2. The Dissenting Opinions
Justice Marshall began his forceful dissent by stating:
"[t]oday's decision turns a critical constitutional guaran-
tee - the Sixth Amendment's right to an impartial
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1905.
254. Id. at 1908.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 1909 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
257. Id.
258. Id.
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jury - into a hollow formality." '259 Marshall took particular ex-
ception to the majority's reasoning that the trial court had dis-
charged its obligation to ensure impartiality by merely asking
the jurors if they could be fair and impartial without first estab-
lishing the information to which they had been exposed.2 60 Jus-
tice Marshall also criticized the majority's holding that a poten-
tial juror's evaluation of his own impartiality will suffice to
qualify him as a juror.61
Justice Marshall recognized that no previous case had re-
vealed the depth of voir dire necessary in instances of pretrial
publicity. Thus Mu'min was a case of first impression,1 2 and, in
Marshall's view, the majority's justification that no previous pre-
trial publicity cases had required content questioning was
irrelevant.6 3
Justice Marshall framed the issue as whether the court was
obliged to ask the eight jurors who indicated media exposure to
identify its content.2 6 After examining the pretrial publicity and
racial bias cases, he logically concluded that a "juror's 'own as-
surances that he is equal to the task cannot be dispositive of the
accused's rights.' "265
Marshall's dissent explored the pretrial publicity cases and
found that the right to a fair trial guarantees an accused the
right to a jury that enters the jury box without any opinions or
preconceptions about the case, and decides the case only on the
evidence presented at trial.266 Accordingly, satisfaction of this
right requires that the trial court ask content questions during
voir dire to prevent potential jurors with opinions or preconcep-
tions from being seated.26 7 "Anything less than this renders the
defendant's right to an impartial jury meaningless.21 6
259. Id. at 1909 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justices Blackmun and Stevens joined all
but part IV of Marshall's dissent. Justice Kennedy filed a separate dissenting opinion.
Id. at 1901.
260. Id. at 1913.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 1912.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 1912.
265. Id. at 1913 (quoting Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 800 (1975)).
266. Id. at 1912.
267. Id. at 1913.
268. Id.
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In addition, Justice Marshall recognized' that because the
petitioner bears the burden of showing juror partiality, the right
to have content questions asked in order to elicit juror prejudice
becomes even more crucial to protect the right to an impartial
jury."' He believed that the right to a fair trial guarantees a
defendant an opportunity to demonstrate bias,2 70 and an ade-
quate record goes a long way in providing this opportunity.
Justice Marshall then identified three reasons why content
questioning during the voir dire is indispensable when potential
jurors have indicated exposure to pretrial publicity.2 7 ' First,
questioning will determine if the type and extent of the public-
ity to which the juror was exposed would warrant his disqualifi-
cation as a matter of law.27 2 Prior decisions such as those in Ir-
vin 27 and Patton274 have held that substantial media coverage
of inflammatory publicity may cause per se disqualification of a
whole community.27 In addition, Marshall had a different inter-
pretation of Irvin than the majority.276
His interpretation stood for the proposition that anyone ex-
posed to highly prejudicial and inflammatory pretrial publicity
cannot fairly judge a case and should be per se disqualified.277
Furthermore, if the information saturates the community, the
community as a whole is presumed to have been exposed and is
per se disqualified.27 8 Therefore, when the community is exposed
to prejudicial information, it should follow a priori that an indi-
vidual juror actually exposed to the information should be per se
disqualified. 9 If jurors are exposed to prejudicial publicity of
the caliber existing in Irvin and Rideau, it may be that their
professions of impartiality should not be believed.2 8
269. Id.
270. Id. (relying on Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1950)).
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961).
274. Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1032 (1984).
275. Irvin, 366 U.S. at 728; Patton, 467 U.S. at 1033.
276. Mu'min, 111 S. Ct. at 1913-14. See supra note 57 and accompanying text for
majority's view of Irvin.
277. Id. at 1914.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
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Second, "content questioning . . . gives legal depth to the
trial court's findings of impartiality."281 A juror may be unaware
or confused about his bias, because impartiality is a mixed ques-
tion of law and fact. Its determination is not merely a factual
one decided by the juror's assertion of impartiality, but also a
legal one requiring the court's expertise in determining imparti-
ality as a matter of law.282
The third reason for mandatory content questioning is to
facilitate the trial court's fact finding, more specifically, to aid in
its determination of juror credibility.2 83 Content questioning aids
not only a trial court's determination of impartiality, but appel-
late review as well. 8" Without an adequate factual background,
the trial court's findings of juror impartiality should not be ac-
corded deference at the appellate level. 285
Justice Marshall believed that the nature and extent of
publicity in Mu'min was highly prejudicial. Therefore, an in-
quiry into exactly what information a juror had received was es-
sential.2 8 Further, any juror hearing stories regarding Mu'min's
confession would have been per se disqualified.2 8
Justice Marshall criticized Justice O'Connor's suggestion
that content questioning is not necessary because the trial judge
can put himself in the place of the juror to determine the extent
and effect of the publicity.288 In addition, he criticized the ma-
jority's claim that content questioning should be rejected be-
cause of the burden it may place on the judicial system.2 8
Justice Marshall concluded his dissent by stating: "the pro-
cedures undertaken in this case amounted to no more than the
trial court going through the motions. I can'not accept that the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury means
so little. '290
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 1915.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 1915-16.
289. Id. at 1916.
290. Id. at 1917. Part IV of Justice Marshall's dissent was based on his belief that
capital punishment is unconstitutional. Id.
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In a separate dissent, Justice Kennedy 9 ' found that the
publicity in Mu'min, unlike in Irvin, was not sufficiently wide-
spread and prejudicial to cause per se disqualification of the
whole community. 9 ' However, Justice Kennedy argued that this
was not dispositive of an individual juror's impartiality.9 3 Jus-
tice Kennedy viewed the issue as "one of historical fact: did the
juror swear he could set aside any opinion he might hold and
decide the case on the evidence, and should the juror's protesta-
tion of impartiality be believed? '2 94
In Kennedy's view, once a juror has acknowledged exposure
to pretrial publicity, the trial court has a duty to independently
assess the juror's impartiality.9 5 Although appellate courts
should accord substantial deference to the trial court's finding of
impartiality, such deference "rests on our expectation that the
trial court will conduct a sufficient voir dire to determine the
credibility of the juror professing to be impartial. 296 Justice
Kennedy argued that the finding of impartiality in Mu'min was
inadequately supported in the record and was therefore entitled
to no deference. 97
IV. Analysis
The Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantee a criminal defendant the
right to a fair trial before an impartial tribunal.2 '98 This require-
ment assures that the accused will be convicted only by evidence
developed at trial, and not by outside influences.9 9 The failure
to accord an accused a fair trial before an impartial, unbiased
jury is a violation of the basic requirements of due process."'
With regard to pretrial publicity, the guarantee is particularly
291. Id. at 1917 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
292. Id. at 1918.
293. Id.
294. Id. (quoting Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1036 (1984)).
295. Id.
296. Id. at 1919.
297. Id.
298. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
299. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 351 (1966) (quoting Marshall v. United
States, 360 U.S. 310, 312 (1959)).
300. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
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important. That adverse pretrial publicity may influence poten-
tial jurors is too obvious to question. Common human experi-
ence indicates that pretrial publicity may impair a defendant's
right to a fair trial" 1 because "[t]he prejudice to the defendant
is almost certain to be as great when the evidence reaches the
jury through news accounts as when it is a part of the prosecu-
tion's evidence. It may be even greater for it is then not tem-
pered by protective procedures."3 2
In previous pretrial publicity cases, the Supreme Court has
consistently recognized the significance of this growing prob-
lem.3"3 In Dennis v. United States,304 the Supreme Court upheld
the conviction of a communist party leader who claimed his trial
was unfair because government employees served as jurors. °0
The Court, while extending the trial court great discretion in
conducting the voir dire, cautioned that the trial court has a "se-
rious duty" to determine if juror bias exists.306 The Dennis
Court then stated that "[i]n exercising its discretion, the trial
court must be zealous to protect the rights of an accused. '30 7 It
is apparent that the trial court in Mu'min lacked zeal in protect-
ing Mu'min's right to a fair trial required by Dennis, and that it
failed to heed the Supreme Court's stern warning in Sheppard
that trial courts must take "strong measures" to insure a fair
trial.308
To carry its burden of ensuring a fair trial, a trial court is
obliged to screen out jurors with a disqualifying state of mind. A
searching voir dire is one technique through which a trial court
can fulfill that obligation.309 Previous Supreme Court decisions
have made it clear that jurors need not be totally ignorant of the
facts of a case.3 10 In fact, potential jurors who do not keep
abreast of current events may be unsuitable.1 However, the
301. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563.
302. Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 312-13 (1959) (citations omitted).
303. See supra discussion accompanying parts II.A & II.B.
304. 339 U.S. 162 (1950).
305. Id. at 172.
306. Id. at 168.
307. Id.
308. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
309. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563-64 (1976).
310. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961).
311. Mark R. Stabile, Comment, Free Press-Fair Trial: Can They be Reconciled in
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possibility that jurors have been exposed to highly prejudicial
information, the nature of which mandates per se disqualifica-
tion, cannot be overlooked by the trial court. '2
The Marshall dissent in Mu'min correctly interprets Irvin
as standing for the proposition that anyone exposed to highly
inflammatory pretrial publicity should not be seated as a juror
solely because he claims to be impartial.31 3 Although the level of
publicity in Mu'min may not have reached the level it did in
Irvin so as to disqualify the whole community, it was arguably
sufficiently inflammatory to disqualify anyone actually
exposed. 1'
In Rideau, it was the nature of the publicity that warranted
community disqualification.3 1 5 In Rideau, the whole community
was presumed to have been exposed to the defendant's confes-
sion, and was thus disqualified.316 It would follow logically that
an individual exposed to information akin to that in Rideau
would also be per se disqualified. This is precisely the case in
Mu'min with respect to jurors who had read or heard about
Mu'min's confession. The trial court, therefore, had a duty to
determine which potential jurors had read about the confession
and to excuse them from service. In addition, jurors in Mu'min
may have been exposed to other highly prejudicial information
that would justify disqualification. The trial court failed to pro-
tect Mu'min from the prejudice caused by the inflammatory
information.
The racial bias cases relied on by both the majority and dis-
sent support the view that a probing voir dire is necessary when
a strong likelihood of prejudice exists." ' In cases where the
threat of racial prejudice represents an impermissible risk to a
fair trial, refusal to allow questioning on the subject of racial
bias violates the essential fairness requirement of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 's In Mu'min, it was acknowledged that
a Publicized Criminal Case?, 79 GEo. L.J. 337,344 (1963).
312. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963).
313. Mu'min, 111 S. Ct. at 1914 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
314. Id.
315. See supra notes 63-71 and accompanying text.
316. Rideau, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
317. See e.g., Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 595 (1976).
318. See, Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 529 (1973); Ristaino, 424 U.S. 595.
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there was substantial pretrial publicity, much of which was prej-
udicial and inflammatory. 1 9 Despite this, the majority refused
to recognize that a substantial risk to Mu'min's right to a fair
trial existed, and therefore, failed to require an inquiry into pos-
sible prejudice.2 Instead, it relied on a juror's assurance of his
own impartiality.3 21 Although the publicity surrounding the trial
alone should have mandated content questioning, the fact that
Mu'min was a capital trial made such questioning imperative.
The Supreme Court, in Turner v. Murray,32 had already ruled
that a capital trial is a special circumstance mandating addi-
tional steps to protect the accused from the effects of
prejudice. 23
Although the Mu'min majority claims to have relied on
cases like Turner, it failed to recognize that the pretrial public-
ity in Mu'min presented a serious risk to a fair trial. It also
failed to follow the teaching of those cases by failing to require
procedures designed to mitigate the effects of the publicity.
Additionally, the Mu'min Court erred in crediting the ju-
rors' assurances of impartiality.2 4 Once jurors are exposed to
highly prejudicial publicity, their assurances of impartiality
should not control. 25 Although the Irvin Court acknowledged
that jurors need not be totally ignorant of the facts surrounding
a case, it held that situations do exist in which the jurors' assur-
ances should be given no weight in determining impartiality.32 6
Jurors may be unaware of their own bias,327 mistaken or con-fused about the actual meaning of impartiality, or confused by
courtroom language. 29 Therefore, jurors are incapable of evalu-
ating their own impartiality.330
319. Mu'min, 111 S. Ct. at 1907.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 1908.
322. 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
323. Id. at 33.
324. Mu'min, 111 S. Ct. at 1908.
325. E.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
326. Id. at 728. In addition, the Supreme Court in Murphy v. Florida held that ju-
rors' assurances of impartiality can not be dispositive of the issue. Murphy v. Florida,
421 U.S. 794, 800 (1975).
327. Mu'min, 111 S. Ct. at 1914 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Brief for the National Jury Project, Amicus Curiae at 5, Mu'min v. Virginia,
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Second, the circumstances in which the voir dire is con-
ducted affect juror responses because most people seek to pre-
sent themselves in a favorable light. 3 1 The Supreme Court in
Irvin stated: "[n]o doubt each juror was sincere when he said
that he would be fair and impartial to the petitioner, but the
psychological impact requiring such a declaration before one's
fellows is often its father. ' 3 2 By conducting voir dire in which
large panels of jurors are examined simultaneously, a juror may
seek either consciously or subconsciously to present himself as
fair and impartial.3
Third, the Court in Irvin held that impartiality is a "mixed
question of law and fact.33s4 Because jurors are lay people, they
cannot evaluate their own impartiality as a matter of law. The
trial court must make an independent legal finding of the juror's
impartiality based on his responses during the voir dire.3 5
In evaluating juror impartiality, the trial court is given great
discretion and substantial deference by appellate courts. How-
ever, this deference is based on the belief that a sufficient voir
dire has been conducted. 6 If the trial court conducts only a
cursory voir dire, its findings of impartiality should be entitled
to little deference. In Rosales-Lopez v. United States,337 the Su-
preme Court stated that "[w]ithout an adequate voir dire the
trial judge's responsibility to remove prospective jurors who will
not be able to impartially follow the court's instructions and
evaluate the evidence cannot be fulfilled. 33 The Court has held
that in the exercise of its discretion, the trial court must be zeal-
ous in protecting the accused's rights. 9 In Mu'min, the proce-
dures employed by the trial court fell far short of zealously pro-
111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991) (No. 90-5193).
331. Id. at 13 (citing John L. Carroll, Speaking the Truth: Voir Dire in a Capital
Case, 3 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 199 (1979).
332. Irvin, 366 U.S. at 728.
333. Brief for Nat'l Jury Project, supra note 322, at 13.
334. Irvin, 366 U.S. at 723.
335. Id.
336. Mu'min, 111 S. Ct. at 1919 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
337. 451 U.S. 182 (1981). In Rosales-Lopez, the Supreme Court upheld the convic-
tion of a Mexican petitioner for his part in a plan to smuggle illegal aliens into the
United States. The petitioner claimed the trial court's failure to ask questions about
biases towards Mexicans during the voir dire deprived him of a fair trial. Id. at 187.
338. Id. at 188.
339. Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 168 (1950).
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tecting Mu'min's right to an impartial jury.34 0
The use of content questioning during the voir dire is a pro-
cedural device by which the trial court can fulfill its obligation
to provide a fair trial by accurately detecting and eliminating
disqualifying prejudices from the jury. Its use was recommended
by the Supreme Court in both Sheppard3 1 and Nebraska
Press.42 Furthermore, the American Bar Association Standards
for Criminal Justice recommend content questioning whenever a
potential juror has indicated exposure to pretrial publicity.3 3
Additionally, many federal circuits have mandated content ques-
tioning in circumstances similar to those in Mu'min.3" Because
a substantial threat existed that pretrial publicity would jeop-
ardize Mu'min's right to a fair trial, the Supreme Court erred in
affirming his conviction. The trial court refused to ask proposed
content questions, and instead merely accepted juror assurances
of impartiality. "[T]he measures a judge takes or fails to take to
mitigate the effects of pretrial publicity ... may well determine
whether the defendant receives a fair trial consistent with the
requirements of due process."""
Perhaps the most compelling reason for mandatory content
questioning is that an accused seeking reversal of a conviction
has an affirmative burden of demonstrating actual jury bias.34
The Supreme Court holds Mu'min to a seemingly impossible
standard. It requires him to demonstrate that his jury was bi-
ased, but fails to guarantee him the procedural device necessary
to meet that burden. Such reasoning is antithetical to previous
Court decisions which have held that the right to a fair trial
guarantees the accused the opportunity to demonstrate any un-
fairness at his trial. 47 In Dennis v. United States, the Court
340. Mu'min, 111 S. Ct. at 1917 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
341. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
342. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.
344. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1978); Silverthorne v.
United States, 400 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1968).
345. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 555 (1976).
346. E.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961).
347. E.g., Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505 (1971). In Groppi, the Supreme Court
invalidated a statute that prohibited a change of venue in misdemeanor cases, no matter
what the circumstances. The Court stated: "under the Constitution, a defendant must be
given an opportunity to show that a change of venue is required in his case." Id. at 511.
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stated: " [p]reservation of the opportunity to prove actual bias is
a guarantee of a defendant's right to an impartial jury."' 48 Simi-
larly, in Murphy v. Florida, the Court stated, "it remains open
to the defendant to demonstrate 'the actual existence of such an
opinion in the mind of a juror as will raise the presumption of
partiality.' ,,149
If the accused is not guaranteed the right to content ques-
tioning during the voir dire, he will be unable to demonstrate
the existence of actual jury bias. Content questioning enables an
accused to demonstrate bias by allowing him to challenge for
cause effectively and by facilitating his effective use of peremp-
tory challenges. In addition, content questioning provides a de-
tailed record of the trial court's findings of impartiality for ap-
pellate review.
The opportunity to challenge jurors for cause is perhaps an
accused's strongest weapon in eliminating biased jurors. The
right to challenge for cause has little meaning if unaccompanied
by the right to ask questions designed to elicit the bias.3 50 With-
out content questioning it will be difficult to expose any bias
caused by adverse pretrial publicity. The failure to provide an
adequate opportunity to challenge for cause may itself be a con-
stitutional violation. 51 The American Bar Association Standards
for Criminal Justice provide that counsel should be given great
latitude in questioning jurors on potential biases in order to fa-
cilitate the use of challenges for cause.352 By denying the request
for content questions, the trial court in Mu'min failed to provide
Mu'min an opportunity to make fully informed challenges for
cause.
Failure to allow content questions also impairs the accused's
use of peremptory challenges .353 Although their use is not a con-
stitutional right, where mandated by statute, the accused should
be afforded liberal opportunity to question about the existence
348. Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1950).
349. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 800 (1975) (quoting Irvin, 366 U.S. at 723).
350. Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 532 (1973)(Marshall, J., concurring in
part).
351. Davis v. Florida, 473 U.S. 913, 914 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting from the
denial of a Writ of Certiorari).
352. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 15-2.4 (2d ed. 1980 & Supp. 1986).
353. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981).
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of prejudices so that peremptory challenges can be exercised
effectively.354
In addition, content questioning enables an accused to exer-
cise his right to preserve a record for appeal. 55 If an accused's
demonstration of juror bias is rejected by the trial court, the ac-
cused will then have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate
the existence of an unfair trial at the appellate level.
To summarize, the Supreme Court has consistently held
that "the right to an impartial jury carries with it the concomi-
tant right to take reasonable steps designed to insure that the
jury is impartial. 3 5 1 In the case of pretrial publicity, the appro-
priate safeguard of a fair trial is the accused's right to demon-
strate that pretrial publicity compromised the impartiality of
the jury and the fairness of the trial.ss In Mu'min, the peti-
tioner was not afforded an opportunity to ask content questions
and was thus unable to meet the burden of showing actual bias.
Although Mu'min did not demonstrate any bias within the jury
that convicted him, the inadequate procedures employed by the
trial court created such a risk that pretrial publicity may have
influenced the jurors, that Mu'min was denied his due process
rights.35
V. Conclusion
The Supreme Court's decision in Mu'min v. Virginia devi-
ated from prior decisions in which the Court espoused a theory
of affirmative action in protecting an accused from the effects of
pretrial publicity.359 Despite the Court's prior mandate that trial
courts be zealous in protecting an accused's rights, the Mu'min
Court affirmed a conviction when the trial court, despite the real
possibility of prejudice, had refused to employ even the mini-
mally intrusive procedure 3 of content questioning during the
voir dire.
354. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 15-2.4 (2d ed. 1980 & Supp. 1986).
355. See, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 727 (1961).
356. See, e.g., Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 532 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
357. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 575 (1981).
358. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542 (1965).
359. E.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
360. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 37 (1986).
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What is particularly troublesome about this decision is that
the Court holds defendants such as Mu'min to a seemingly im-
possible standard. The Court requires them to show actual juror
prejudice when seeking a retrial, but fails to guarantee them the
benefit of using a procedure designed to meet that burden.
Without the guaranteed ability to use content questioning, effec-
tive use of the voir dire in high profile cases becomes subject to
judicial discretion. Thus, the guarantee of a fair trial hinges on
the discretion of the trial judge. This decision does indeed turn a
defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial into a "hollow for-
mality"3 ' subject to the whim of the trial judge.
Brian P. Coffey*
361. Mu'min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899, 1909 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
* The author wishes to thank his parents, family and friends for their support.
1993]
37
